T HE subject-matter of Jiterary criticism is an art, and criticism is presumably an art too. This sounds as though crjticism were a parasitic form of literary expressionJ an art based on pre-existing art, a second·hand imitation of creative power. The conception of the critic as a creator manque is very popular~ especially among artists. Yet the critic has specific jobs to do which the experience of literature has proved to be less ignoble. One obvious function of criticism is to mediate between the artist and his public. Art that tries to do without criticism is apt to get involved in either of twc fallacies. One is the attempt to reach the public directly through "popu]ar» ar:t, the as· sumption being that criticism is artificial and public taste natur_ aL Below this is a further assumption about natural taste which goes back to Rousseau. The opposite fallacy is the conception of art as a mystery) an initiation into an esoteric community. Here criticism is restricted to masonic signs of occult understanding, to significant exclamations and gestures and oblique cryptic comments. Thls fallacy is like the other one in assuming a rough correlation between the merit of art and the degree of public response to it, though the cor~ relation it assumes is inverse. But art of this kind is cut off from society as a whole, not so much because it retreats from life-the usual charge against it-as because it rejects criticism.
On the other hand, a public that attempts to do without criticism, and asserts that it knows what it likes, brutalizes the arts. Rejection of criticism from the point of view of the public, or its guardians, is involved in all forms of censorship. Art is a continuously emancipat~ ing factor in societyJ and the critic, whose job it is to get as many people in contact with the best that has been and is being thought and said, 5s, at least ideally, the pioneer of education and the shaper of cultural tradition. There is no immediate correlation either way between the merits of art and its general reception. Shakespeare was more· popular than Webster, but not because he was a greater dramatist; W. H. Auden is less popular than Edgar Guest, but not because he is a better poet. But after the critic has been at work for a while, some positive correlation may begin to take shape. Most of Shakespeare,s current popularity is due to critical publicity.
W-hy does criticism have to e..xist? The best and shortest answer is that it can talk~ and all the arts are dumb. In painting, sculpture, or music it ~ easy enough to see that the art shows forth, and cannot say anything. And, though it sounds like a frantic paradox to say that the . poet is inarticulate or speechless, literary works also are, for the critic, mute complexes of fac_ts, like the data of science. Poetry is a disinterested use of words: it does not address a reader directly. When it does so, we feel that the poet has a certain distrust in the capacity of readers and critics to interpret his meaning without assistance, and has therefore stopped creating a poem and begun to ta.lk. It is not merely tradition that impels a poet to invoke a Muse and protest that his utterance is involuntary. Nor is it mere paradox that causes Mr. MacLeish, in his famous "Ars Poetica,)) to apply the words "mute," "dumb/) and "wordless)) to a poem. The poet, as Mill saw in a wonderful flash of critical insight, is not heard, but overheard. The first assumption of criticism, and the assumption on which the autonomy of criticism rests, is not that the poet does not know what he is talking about, but that he cannot talk about what he knows, any more than the painter or composer can.
The poet may of course have some critical ability of his own, and so interpret his own work; but the Dante who writes a commentary on the first canto of the Paradiso is merely one more of Dantes critics. What he says has a peculiar interest, but not a peculiar authority. Poets are too often the most unreliable judges of the value or even the meaning of what they have written. When Ibsen maintains that Emperor and Galilean is his greatest play and that certain episodes in Peer Gynt are not allegorical, one can only say that Ibsen is an indifferent critic of Ibsen. Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads is a remarkable document, but as a piece of Wordsworth.ian criticism nobody would give .it more than about a B plus. Critics of Shakespeare are often supposed to be ridiculed by the assertion that if Shakespeare were to come back from the dead he would not be able to -understand their criticism and would accuse them of reading far more meaning into his work than he intended. This, though pure hypothesis 1 is likely enough: we have very little evidence of Shakespeare's interest in criticism, either of himself or of anyone else. But all that this means is that Shakespeare, though a great dramatist, was not also the greatest of Shakespearean critics. Why should he be?
The notion that the poet is necessarily his own best interpreter is indissolubly linked with the conception of the critic as a parasite or jackal of literature. Once we admit that he has a specific field of activity, and that he has autonomy within that field, we are forced to concede .that criticism deals with literature in terms of a specific con- HereJ however, we have arrived at another conception of criticism which is different from the one we started with. This autonomous organizing of literature may be criticism, but it is not the activity of mediating between the artist and his public which we at first ascribed to criticism. There is one kind of critic, evidently, who faces the public and another who is still as completely involved in literary values as the poet himself. We may call this latter type the critic proper, and the former the critical reader. It may sound like quibbling to imply such a distinction, but actually the whole question of whether the critic has a real function, independent both of the artist at his most explicit and of the public at its most discriminating, is involved in it.
Our present-day critical traditions are rooted in the age of Hazlitt and Arnold and Sainte-Beuve, who were, ~ terms of our distinction, critical readers. They represented, not another conceptual framework within literature, but .the reading public at its most expert and judicious. They conceived it to be the task of a critic to exemplify how a man of taste uses and evaluates literature, and thus how literature is to be absorbed into society. The nineteenth century has bequeathed to us the conception of the causerie, the man of taste's reflections on works of literature, as the normal form of critical expression. I give one example of the difference between a critic and a critical reader which amounts to a head-on collision. Ruskin is a critic, perhaps the only important one that the Victorian age produced, and, whether he is righ-t or wrong, what he is attempting is genuine criticism. He is trying to interpret Shakespeare in terms of a conceptual framework which belongs to the critic alone, and yet relates itself to the plays alone. Arnold is perfectly right in feeling that this is not the sort of material that the public critic can directly use. But he does not suspect the existence of criticism as we have defined it above. Here it :is Arnold who is the provincial. Ruskin has learned his trade from the great icon,ological1radition which comes down through classical and biblical scholarship into Dante and Spenser, both of whom he knew how to read, and which is incorporated in the medieval cathedrals he had pored over in such detail. Arnold is assuming, as a universal law of nature, certain "plain sense" critical assumptions which were hardly heard of before Dryden's time and which can assuredly not survive the ~ge of Freud and Jung and Frazer and Cassirer. What emerges from this is that the critic and critical reader are each better off when they know of one anothees existence, and perhaps best off when their work forms different aspects of the same thing.
However, the causerie does not, or at least need not, involve any fallacy in the theory of criticism itself. The same cannot be said of the reaction against the causerie which has produced the leading twentieth-century substitute for criticism. This is the integrated system of re.ligious 1 philosophical, and political ideas which takes in, as a matter of course, a critical attitude to literature. Thus Mr. Eliot defines his out]ook as class.ica] in literature, royalist in politics) anglocatholic in religion; and it is clear that the third of these has been the spark-plug, the motivating power that drives the other two. Mr. Allen Tate describes his own critical attitude as "reactionaryH in a sense intended to include political and philosophical over.tones 1 and the same is true of Hulme's Speculations, which are primarily political speculations. Mr. Yvor Winters collects hjs criticism under the title "In Defence of Reason." What earthly business, one may inquire, has a literary critic to defend reason? He might as well be defending virtue. And so we coul-d go through the list of Marxist, Thomist, --.,.
Kierkegaardian, Freuclian, Jungian, Spenglerian, or existential critics, all determined to substitute a critical attitude for criticism, all proposing, not to find a conceptual framework for criticism within literature, but to -attach criticism to one of a miscellany of frameworks outside it.
The axioms and postulates of criticism have to grow out of the art that the crjtic is dealing with. The first thing that the literary critic has to do is to read literature, to make an inductive survey of his Dwn field and let his critical principles shape themselves solely out of his knowledge of that field. Critical principles cannot be taken over ready-made from theology, philosophy_, politics, science, or any combination of these. Further, an inductive survey of his own field is equally essential for the critic of painting or of music, and so each art has its own criticism. Aesthetics, or the consideration of art as a whole, is not a form of criticism but a branch of philosophy. I state all this as dogma, but I think the experience of literature bears me out. To .subordinate criticism to a critical attitude .ls to stereotype certain values in literature which can be related to the extra-literary source of the value-judgment. Mr. Eliot does not mean to say that Dante is a greater poet than Shakespeare or perhaps evtn Milton; yet he imposes on literature an extra-literary schematism, a sort of religio-political colour-filter, which makes Dante leap into prominence, shows Milton up as dark and faulty, and largely obliterates the outlines of Shakespeare. All that the genuine critic can do with this colour-filter is to murmur politely that it shows things in a new light and is indeed a most stimulating contrjbution to criticism.
If it is insisted .that we cannot criticize literature until we have acquired a coherent philosophy of critic]sm with its centre of gravity in something else, the existence of criticism as a separate subject is still being denied. But there is one· possibility further. If criticism exists, it must be, we have said, an examination of literature in tenns of a conceptual frameworl< derivable from an inductive survey of the literary field. The word "inductive" suggests some sort of scientific procedure. What if criticism is a science as wel1 as an art? The writing of history is an art, but no one doubts that scientific principles are involved in the historian's treatment of evidence, and that the presence of this scientific element is what distinguishes history from legend. Is it also a scientific element jn criticism which dis.tinguishes it from causerie on the one hand, and the superimposed critical atti· tude on · the other? For just as the presence of science changes the character of a subject from the casual to the causal, from the random and intuitive to the systematic, so it also safeguards the integrity of a subject from external invasions. So we may find in science a means of strengthening the fences of criticism against enclosure movements coming not only from religion and philosophy, but frGm the other sciences as well.
If criticism is a science, it is clearly a social science, which means that it should waste no time in trying to assimilate its methods to those of the natural sciences. Like psychology, it is directly concerned · with the human mind~ and will only confuse itself with statistical methodologies. I understand that there is a Ph.D. thesis somewhere that displays a list of Hardy's novels in the order of the percentages of gloom that they contain, but one does not feel that that sort of procedure should be encouraged. Yet as the field is narrowed to the social sciences the distinctions must be kept equally sharp. Thus there can be no such thing as a sociological "approach" to literature. There is no reason why a sociologist should not work exclusively on literary material, but if he does he should pay no attention to literary values.
In his field Horatio Alger and the writer of the Elsie books are more important than Hawthorne or Melville, and a s.ingle jssue of the Ladies~ Home ] ournal is worth all of Henry James. The literary critic using sociological data is similarly under no obligation to respect sociological values. · It seems absurd to say that there may be a scientific element in criticism when there are dozens of learned journals based on the assumption that there is, and thousands of scholars engaged in a scientific procedure related to literary criticism. Either literary criticism is a science, or all these highly trained and intelligent people are wasting their time on a pseudo-science, one to be ranked with phrenology and election forecasting. Yet one is forced to wonder whether scholars as a whole are consciously aware that the assumptions on which their work is based are scientific ones. In the growing complication of secondary sources which constitutes literary scholarship, one misses, for the most part, that sense of systematic progressive consolidation which belongs to a science. Research begins in what is known as "background," and one would expect it, as it goes on, to organize the foreground as well. The digging up of relevant information about a poet should lead to a steady consolidating progress in the criticism of his poetry. One feels a certain failure of nerve in coming out of the background into the foreground, and research seems to prefer to become centrifugal, moving away from the works of art into more and more research projects. devoted to an analysis of the argument of The Faerie Queene itself, though there are any number on its sources, and, of course, background. As for Blake, I have read a whole shelf of books on his poetry by. critics who did not know what any of his major poems meant. The better ones were distingillshable only by the fact that they did not boast of their ignorance.
The reason for this is that research is ancillary to criticism, but the critic to whom the researcher should entrust his materials hardly exists. What passes for criticism is mainly the work of critical readers or spokesmen of various critical attitudes, and these make, in general, a random and haphazard use of scholarship. Such criticism is therefore often regarded by the researcher as a subjective and regre...<;si.ve dilettantism, interesting in its place, but not real work. On the other hand) the critical reader is apt to treat the researcher as Hamlet did the grave-digger, ignoring everything he throws out except an odd skull that he can pick up and moralize about. Yet unless research consolidates .into a criticism which preserves the scientific and systematic element in research, the literary scholar will be debarred by his choice of profession from ever making an immediately significant contribution to culture. The absence of direction in research is, naturally, clearest on the very lowest levels of all, where it is only a spasmodic laying of unfertilized eggs in order to avoid an administrative axe. Here the research is characterized by a kind of desperate tentativeness, an implied hope that some synthesizing critical Messiah of the future will find it useful. A philologist can show the relationship of even the most minute study of dialect to his subject as a whole, because philology is a properly organized science. But the researcher who collects all a poet's references to the sea or God or beautiful women does not know who will find this useful or in what ways it could be used, because he has no theory of imagery.
I am not, obviously, saying that literary scholarship at present i-; doing the wrong thing or shouJd be doing something else: I am saying that it should be possible to get a clearer and more systematic comprehension of what it is doing. Most literary scholarship could be described as prior criticism (the so-called "lower" criticiSm of biblical scholarship L the editing of texts and the collecting of relevant facts.
Of the posterior (or "higher,) criticism that ~ obviously the final cause of this work we have as yet no theory, no tradition, and above all no systematic organization. We have, of course, a good deal of the thing itself. There is even some good posterior criticism of Spenser, though most of it was vvritten in the eighteenth century. And in every age the great scholar will do the right thing by the instinct of genius. But genius .is rare, and scholarship .is not.
II
Sciences normally begin in a state of naive induction: they come immecliately in contact with phenomena and take the th.ing-N to be explained as their immediate data. Tlius physics began by taking the immediate sensations of experience, classified as hot, cold, moist, and dry, as fundamental principles. Eventually physics turned inside out 1 and discovered that its real funct:_ion was to explain what heat and moisture were. History began as chronicle; but the clifference between the old chronicler and the modem historian is that to the chronicler the events he recorded were also the structure of history, whereas the historian sees these events as historical phenomena, to be explained in terms of a conceptual framework different in shape from them. Similarly each modern science has had to take what Bacon caBs (though in another context) an inductive leap, occupying a new vantage ground from which it could see its former principles as new things to be explained. As long as astronomers regarded the movements of heavenly bodies as the structure of astronomy, they were compelled to regard their own point of view as fixed. Once they thought of movement as itself an explainable phenomenon, a mathematical theory of movement became the conceptual framework, and so the way was cleared for the heliocentric solar system and the law of gravitation. As long as biology thought of animal and vegetable forms of life as constituting its subject, the different branches of biology were largely efforts of cataloguing. As soon as it was the existence of forms of life themselves that had to be explained, the theory of evolution and the conceptions of protoplasm and the cell poured into biology and completely revitalized it.
It occurs to me that literary criticism is now in such a state of naive induction as we find in a primitive science. Its materials} the masterpieces of literature, are not yet regarded as phenomena to be explained in tenns of a conceptual framework which criticism alone possesses. They are still regarded as somehow constituting the framework or form of criticism as well. I suggest that it is time for criticism
to leap to a new ground from which it can discover what the organ· izing or containing forms «?f its conceptual framework are. And no one can examine the present containing forms of criticism withoutbeing depressed by an overwhelming sense of unreality. Let me give one example. In confronting any work of literature, one obvious containing form is .the genre to which it belongs. And criticism, incredible as it may seem_, has as yet no coherent conception of genres. The very word sticks out in an English sentence as the unpronounceable and alien thing it is. In poetry, the common-sense Greek division by methods of performance, which distinguishes poetry as lyric, epic, or dramatic according to whether it is SWig, spoken, or shown forth, survives vestigially. On the whole it does not fit the facts of Western poetry, though in Joyce's Portrait there is an interesting and suggestive attempt made to re-define the terms. So, apart from a drama which belongs equally to prose, a handful of epics recogni2able as such only because they are classical imitations, and a number of long poems also called epics because they are long, we are reduced to the ignoble and slovenly practice of calHng almost the whole of poetry "lyric" because the Greeks had no other word for it. The Greeks did not need to develop a dassi:fication of prose forms: we do, but have never done so. The circulating-library distinction between fiction and non-fiction, between books which are about things admitted not to be true and books which are about everything clse, is apparently satisfactory to us. Asked what the forms of prose fiction are, the literary critic can only say, "well, er-the novel.', Asked what form of prose fiction Gullivers Travels, which is clearly not a novel, belongs to, there is not one critic in a hundred who could give a definite answer, and not one in a thousand who would regard the answer (which happens to be "Menippean satire") as essential to the critical treatment of the book. Asked what he is working on, the critic will invari 6 ably say that he is working on Donne, or Shelley's thought, or the period from 1640 to 1660, or give some other answer which implies that history, or philosophy, or literature itself> constitutes the structural basis of criticism. It would never occur to any critic to say, for instance, "I am working on the theory of genres." If he actually were interested in tllls, he would say that he was working on a "general'' topic; and the work he would do would probably show the marks of na'ive induction: that is, it would be an effort to classify and pigeonhole instead of clarifying the tradition of the genre.
If Critics, qf course, maintain that they know this, and that they keep the linguistic categories only for convenience. But theoretical fictions have a way of becoming practical assumptions, and in no time the meaningless convenience of "English literature" expands into the meaningless inconvenience of the "history of English Jiterature., Now, again, the historian must necessarily regard literature as an historical product and its works as historical documents. It is also quite true that the time a work was written in forms an essential criti-· cal conception. But again, to the literary critic, as such, the phrase "history of English literature" ought to mean nothing at a11. If he doubts this, let him try writing one, and he will find himself confronted by an insolub1e problem of form, or rather by an indissoluble amorphousness. The "history', part of his project is an abstract history, a bald chronicle of names and dates and works and influences, deprived of all the real historical interest that a real historian would give it, however much enlivened with discussions of "background." This chronicle is periodically interrupted by conventional judgments of va]ue Jugged in from another world, which con1use the history and yet are nothing by themselves. The form of literary history has not been discovered, and probably does not exist, and every successful one bas been either a textbook or a lour de force.
Linear time is not an exa<:t enough category to catch literature, and all writers whatever are subtly belittled by a purely historical treatment.
Biography, a branch of history, presents a similar fallacy to the critic, for the biographer turns to a different job and a different kind of book when he turns to criticism. Again, the man who wrote the poem is one of the legitimate containing forms of criticism. But here we have to distinguish the poet qua poet, whose work is a single imaginative body, from the poet as man, who is something else altogether. The latter involves us in what is known as the personal heresy; or rather the heroic fallacy. For a biographer, poetry is an emanation of a personality; for the literary critic it is not, and the problem is to detach it from the personality and consider it on impersonal merits. The no man's land between biography and criticism, the process by which a poefs impressions of his environment are transmuted into poetry, has to be viewed by biographer and critic from opposite points of view. The process is ·too complex ever to be completely unified, Lowes's Road to X anail:u being the kind of exception· that goes a long way to prove the rule. In Johnson's Lives of the Poets a biographical narrative is followed by a critical analysis, and the break between them is so sharp that it is represented in the text by a space.
In all these cases, the same principle recurs. The critic is surrounded by biography, history, philosophy, and language. No one doubts that he has to familiarize h1mself with these subjects. But is his job only to be the jackal of the historian, the philologist, and the biographer, or can he use these subjects in his own way? If he is not to sell out to all his neighbours in tum, what is distinctive about his approach to the poet's life, the time when he lived, and the language he wrote? To ask tills is to raise one of the problems involved in the whole question of what the containing forms of literature are as they take their place in the conceptual framework of criticism. This confronts me with the challenge to make my criticism of criticism constructive. All I have space to do is to outline what I think the first major steps should be.
We have to see what literature is, and try to distinguish the category of literature among all the books there are in the world. I do not know that criticism has made any serious effort to determine what literature is. Next, as discussed above, we should examine the containing forms of criticism, including the poefs life, his historical context, his language, and his thought, to see whether the critic can impose a unified critical form on these things, without giving place to or turning into a biographer, an historian, a philologist, or a philosopher. Next, we should establish the broad distinctions, such as that between prose and poetry, which are preparatory to working out a comprehensive theory of genres. I do not know that critics have clearly explained what the difference between prose and poetry, for instance, really is. Then we should try to see whether the critic, like his neighbours the historian and the philosopher, lives in his own unive~e. To the historian there is nothing that cannot be considered historically; to the philosopher nothing that cannot be considered philosophically.
Does the critic aspire to contain all things in criticism, and so swallow history and philosophy .in his own synthesis., or must he be forever the historian's and philosopher's pupil? If I have shown up Arnold in a poor light, I should say that he is the only one I know who suggests that criticism can be, like history and philosophy, a total attitude to experience. And finally, since criticism may obviously deal with anything in a poem from its superficial texture to its ultimate significance, the question arises whether there are different levels of meaning in literature, and, if so, whether they can be defined and classified.
It follows that arriving at value-judgments is not, as it' is so often said to be,-part of the immediate tactic of criticism. Criticism is not well enough organized as yet to know what the factors of value in a critical judgment are. For instance, as was indicated above in connection with Blake and Spenser, the question of the quality of a poefs thinking as revealed in the integration of his argument is an essential factor in a value-judgment, but many poets are exhaustively discussed in terms of value without this factor being considered. Contemporary judgments of value come mainly from either the critical reader or from the spokesman of a critical attitude. That is, they must be on the whole either unorganized and tentative, or over-organized and irrelevant. For no one can jump directly from research to a valuejudgment. I give one melancholy instance. I recently read a study of the sources of mythological allusions in some of the romantic poets; which showed that for the second part of Faust Goethe had used a misce1Iany of cribs} some of dubious authenticity. "I have now 1 I hope,» said the author triumphantly at the end of his investigation, "given sufficient proof that the second part (lf Faust is not a great work of art." I do not deny the ultimate importance of the valuejudgment. I would even consider the suggestion that the valuejudgment is precisely what distinguishes the social from the natural science. But the more important it is, the more careful we should be about getting it solidly established.
What literature is may perhaps best be understood by an analogy. We shaH have to labour the analogy, but that is due mainly to the novelty of the idea here presented. Mathematics appears to begin in the counting and measuring of objects, as a numerical commentary on the world. But the mathematician does not think of his subject as the counting and measuring of physical objects at all. For him it is an autonomous language, and there is a point at which it becomes in a measure independent of that corrrmon field of experience which we think of as the physical world, or as existence, or as reality, according to our mood. Many of its terms, such as irrational numbers, have no direct connection with the common field of experience, but depend for their meaning solely on 1:he interrelations of the subject itself.
Irrational numbers in mathematics may be compared to prepositions in verbal languages, which, unlike nouns and verbs, have no external symbolic reference. When we distinguish pure from applied mathematics, we are thinking of the former as a disinterested conception of numerical relationships, concerned more and more with itc; inner integrity, and less and less with its reference to external criteria.
vVhere, in that case, is pure mathematics going? We may gain a hint from the final chapter of Sir James Jeans' Mysterious Universe)
which I choose because it shows some of the characteristics of the imaginative leap to a new conceptual framework already mentioned. There, the author speaks of the failure of physical cosmology in the nineteenth century to conceive· of the universe as ultimately mechani~ cal, and suggests that a mathematical approach to it may have better luck. The universe cannot be a machine, but it may be an interlocking set of mathematical formulas. What this means is surely that pure mathematics erists in a mathematical universe which is no longer a commentary on an ''outside" world, but contains that world within itself. Mathematics is at first a fonn of understanding an objective world regarded as its content, but in the end it conceives of the content as being itself mathematical in form, so that when the conception of the mathematical universe is reached, form and content become the same thing.
Jeans was a mathematician> and thought of his mathematical unive_rse as the universe. Doubtless it .is, but it does not follow that the only way of conceiving it is mathematical. For we think also of literature at first as a corrunentary on an external "life" or "reality.H But just as in mathematics we have to go from three apples to three, and from a square field to a square 1 so in reading Jane Austen we have to go from the faithful reflection of English society to the novel, and pass from literature as symbol to literature as an autonomous language. And just as mathematics exists in a mathematical universe which is at the circumference of the common field of experience, so literature exists in a verbal universe, which is not a commentary on life ar reality, but contains life and reality in a system of verbal relationships. This concepti{)n of a verbal universe, in which life and reality are inside literature, and not outside it and being described or represented or approached or symbolized by it} seems to me the first postulate of a properly organized criticism.
It is vulgar for the critic to think of literature as a tiny palace of art looking out upon an inconceivably gigantic "life." "Life" should be for the critic only the seed-plot of literature, a vast mass of potential literary forms, onJy a few of which will grow up into the greater world of the verbal universe. Similar universes exist for all the arts. "We make to ourselves pictures of facts,, says Wittgenstein, but by pictures he means representative illustrations, which are not pictures. Picture.s as pictures are themselves facts, and exist only in a pictorial universe. It is easy enough to say that while the stars in their courses may f{)rm the subject of a poem, they will still remain . the stars in their courses, forever outside poetry. But this is pure regression to the common field of experience, and nothing more; for the more strenuously we try to conceive the stars in their courses in noll-literary ways, the more assuredly we shall faU into the idioms and conventions of some other mental ·universe. The conception of a constant external reality acts as a kind of censor principle in the arts. Painting has been much bedevilled by it, and much of the freakishness of modern painting is clearly due to the energy of its revolt against the representational fallacy. Music on the other hand has remained fairly free of it: at least no one, so far as I know, iruists that it is flying in the face of common sense for music to do anything but reproduce the sounds heard in external nature. In literature the chief function of representationalism is to neutralize its opposing fallacy of an "inner, or subjective reality.
These. different universes are presumably different ways of conceiving the same universe. What we call the common field of experience is a provisional means of unifying them on the level of senseperception, and it is natural to infer a higher unity, a sort of beatification of common sense. But it is not easy to find any human language capable of reachlng such exalted heights. If it is true, as is being increasingly asserted, that metaphysics is a system of verbal oonstructions with no direct reference to external criteria by means of which its truth or falsehood may be tested, it follows that metaphysics forms part of the verbal universe. Theology postulates an ultimate reality in God> but it does not assume that man is capable of describing it in his own terms, nor does it claim to be itself such a description. In any case, if we assert this final unity too quickly we may IDJUre the integrity of the different means of approaching it.
It does not help a poet much to tell him that the function of literature is to empty itself mto an ocean of super-verbal significance, when the nature of that significance is unknown.
Pure mathematics, we have said, does not relate itself directly to the conrmon field of experience, but indirectly, not to avoid it, but with the ultimate design of swallowing it. It thus presents the appearance of a series of hypothetical possibilities. It by-passes the confinnation from without which is the goal of applied mathematics, and seeks it only from within: its conclusionS are related primarily to its own pr-emises. Literature also proceeds by hypothetical possibilities. The poet, said Sidney} never a.ffirmeth. He never says "this is sd'; he says "let there be such a situation," and poetic truth, the validity of his conclusion, is to be tested primarily by its coherence with his original postulate. Of course, there is applied literature, just as there is applied mathematics, which we test historically, by its lifelikeness, or philosophically, by the cogency of its propostions. Literature, like mathematics, is constantly useful, a word which means having a continuing relatiDnship to the common field of experience. But pure literature, like pure mathematics, is disinterested, or useless: it contains its own meaning. Any attempt to determine the category of literature must start with a distinction between the verbal form which is primarily itself and the verbal form which is primarily related to something else. The former is a complex verbal fact, the latter a complex of verbal symbols.
We have to use the mathematical analogy once more before we leave it. Literature is, of course, dependent on the haphazard and unpredictable appearance of creative genius. So actually is mathematics, but we hardly notice this because in mathematics a steady consolidating process goes on, and the work of its geniuses is absorbed in the evolving and expanding pattern of the mathematical universe. Literature being as yet unorganized by criticism, it still appears as a huge aggregate or miscellaneous pile of creative efforts. The only organizing principle so far cfucovered in it is chronology, and when we see the miscellaneous pile strung out along a chronological 1ine, some coherence is given to it by the linear factors in tradition. We can trace an epic tradition by virtue of the fa_ct that Virgil succeeded Homer, Dante Virgil, and Milton Dante. But, as a1ready suggested, this is very far from being the best we can do. Criticism has still to develop a -theory of literature which will see this aggregate within a verbal universe, as forms integrated within a total form. An epic, besides occurring at a certain point in time, is also somethjng of a definitive statement of the poet's imaginative experience, whereas a lyrk is usually a more fragmentary one. This suggests the image of a kind of radiating circle of literary experience in which the lyric is nearer to a periphery and the epic nearer to a centre. It is only an image, but the notion that literature, like any other form of .knowledge, possesses a centre and a circumference seems reasonable enough.
If so, then literature is a single body, a vast organically growing form, and, though of cDurse works of art do not improve, yet it may be possible for criticism to see literature as showing a progressive · evolution in time, of a kind rather like what Newman postulates for Catholic dogma. One could collect remarks by the dozen from various critics, many of them quite misleading, to show that they are d.imly aware, on some level of consciousness, of the ·possibility of a critical progress toward a total comprehension of literature which no critical history gives any hint of. When Mr. Eliot says that the whole tradition of Western poetry from Homer down ought to exist simultaneously in the poet's mind, the ·adverb suggests a transcending by criticism of the tyranny of historical categories. I even think that the consolidation of literature by criticism . into the verbal universe was one of the things that Matthew Arnold meant by culture. To begin this process seems to me the function of criticism at the present time.
